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Abstract
A major issue in computer security is limiting the affects a program can have on a
computer. One way of accomplishing this is to place the program into a limited
environment called a sandbox. Many attempts have been made to create an effective
sandbox, one that effectively limits the affects a program can have, yet does not make the
program unusable. The sandboxes based around intercepting system calls have
historically not been effective; however, sandboxes that limit the resources programs can
access, have been effective. To test the effectiveness of a sandbox that limits the resources
a program can access on a Windows 7 computer, a sandbox, Magnesium Object Manager
Sandbox (MOMS), that uses the Object Manager (OM) callback functionality is created.
The OM is the kernel mode Windows component that facilitates access to every resource;
third party drivers can monitor and limit the access rights to those resources by registering
a function to be called by the OM whenever a program first accesses a resource.
Performance data is collected on a set of test programs, running with and without
MOMS, and with different hardware configurations. Based on this data, MOMS has a
negligible impact, an impact a normal user probably will not notice, to the performance of
the test programs, and the hardware configuration also has a negligible impact on
performance, with or without MOMS. To test the effectiveness of MOMS, exploits are run
against a subset of the test programs and whether the associated payload was successful is
recorded. None of the payloads successfully ran, which indicates MOMS can be an
effective sandbox. While these tests of the efficiency and effectiveness of MOMS are
promising, they are limited in scope and further testing is required in order to increase
their scope. Furthermore, MOMS is analyzed to identify possible vulnerabilities it may
have. While there are some, they are all straightforward to fix with further development.
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1 Introduction
People use many programs on their computers in order to accomplish specific tasks.
The programs are expected to complete those tasks, and only those tasks, but how can that
expectation be enforced? One way is to place the program into a sandboxed, or limited,
environment, thereby restricting the tasks the program can perform. Previous sandbox
implementations have been made, but some information about how operating
systems (OSs) work is needed before they can be explained.
Modern, mainstream, OSs have two modes of operation, kernel mode and user mode.
Kernel mode contains the core of the OS and provides functionality, such as access to the
file system, to the processes in the user mode. User mode provides a restricted
environment for “normal” processes (processes that do not modify or extend the OS itself)
to run in. In user mode, processes cannot directly access other processes, unless the other
process specifically allows it, and they cannot directly access the kernel mode; they
interact with the kernel mode by making system calls. When a user mode process makes a
system call, it requests the OS to perform an action, such as writing to or reading from a
file, on its behalf.
The previous implementations have relied on intercepting system calls and then
allowing or denying the system call based on the sequence of previous system calls or
based on the parameters associated with the system call. The problem with allowing or
denying a system call based on previous ones is that it often leads to too many false
positives for the sandbox to be useful. Sandboxes that make the determination of whether
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to allow or deny a system call based on the associated parameters often are too ineffective
because of the number of different values for the parameters. Other sandbox
implementations restrict the resources a process can access based on other mechanisms,
such as using built-in components of the OS. Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) and
FreeBSD Jails are examples of this latter method implemented on Linux and Unix, but
non have been implemented on Windows, to the knowledge of the author. To explore the
viability of this latter method on Windows, a proof-of-concept implementation,
Magnesium Object Manager Sandbox (MOMS), is created that uses the Object
Manager (OM) to restrict the resources sandboxed processes can access.
Windows 7 32-bit, and other Windows OSs, internally, represent every resource as an
object, which is a kernel mode structure that contains the necessary information to
represent the underlying resource. The OM manages all the objects and facilitates every
access to the objects. To interact with an object, a user mode process must have a handle
to it. A handle is a reference to an object. When a user mode process wants to access an
object, it requests a handle to it from the OM, along with the access rights it wants over it.
If the permissions the process possesses allow the requested access rights over the object,
the OM issues the process a handle to the object and stores the access rights the process
requested. When the process wants to perform an operation on an object it has a handle to,
the process requests the OS to perform the action on the object, by sending the OS the
handle and the desired action. If the access rights the process initially requested, when it
obtained the handle, are sufficient to allow the desired action, the OS performs it.
The access rights associated with a handle can be restricted further, by third party
code running in kernel mode, by registering a callback function with the OM. When a
callback function is registered with the OM, the OM calls the function every time a
process receives a handle to an object. MOMS uses this functionality in both of its modes
of operation: the Rules Generation Mode (RGM) and the Enforcement Mode (EnfM). The
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RGM logs the objects, and the corresponding access rights, that a program receives over
the course of its operation. From this log, a list of objects, and the maximum allowed
access rights, is generated by an administrator and enforced by the EnfM.
The goals of MOMS is for it to run efficiently and to be effective. In order to run
efficiently, MOMS must not add an excessive amount of overhead, which would cause
users not to use it, because it slows down their system too much. MOMS must be effective
in two aspects, the RGM must accurately log the objects a program accesses, along with
the corresponding access rights, and the EnfM must ensure a program cannot alter the
system in such a way that it is able to access an object it should not be able to. Since the
logging of object accesses by the RGM and the object access checking by the EnfM both
run in linear time, MOMS is expected to run efficiently. Since every object access request
is viewable by MOMS, the RGM and the EnfM can log and check, respectively, every
object access; therefore, MOMS is expected to be effective,
Once MOMS is implemented, its efficiency and effectiveness is determined. The
operation of the RGM is very similar to that of the EnfM, so the RGM will be used to
indicate the overall efficiency of MOMS. To determine the efficiency of MOMS,
performance metrics will be collected on a set of test programs running in and out of the
RGM with various hardware configurations and program input. To determine the effect
the amount of available memory and the number of processor cores have on performance,
for each combination of program, program input, and whether the program is running with
or without the RGM, the performance metrics of the various hardware configurations will
be compared. To determine the performance impact of the RGM, the performance metrics
with and without the RGM will be compared, for each combination of program, program
input, and hardware configuration. Finally, the effectiveness of MOMS will be determined
by running a set of exploits against a subset of the programs and recording whether the
EnfM prevents the exploit from executing its payload. Furthermore, possible
3
vulnerabilities in MOMS will be identified and analyzed to determine the effect they have
on the security that MOMS offers.
4
2 Related Work
“A sandbox is an environment in which the actions of a process are restricted
according to a security policy” [10, p. 444]. This definition includes methods such as
individual programs sandboxing themselves, the operating system (OS) creating a
sandbox around programs, and the entire OS running in a sandboxed environment through
hardware virtualization. Program level sandboxes allow the program author to just
sandbox the most vulnerable portions, but this method leaves the unsandboxed portions of
the program vulnerable, are vulnerable to kernel exploits and users overriding restrictions,
and require the program to be rewritten. Operating system (OS) level sandboxes do not
require programs to be rewritten, but are still vulnerable to kernel exploits and are also
potentially vulnerable to users overriding restrictions. Hardware virtualization provides
the most secure environment, since the host OS is not vulnerable to exploits of the
sandboxed OS, but it does present significant usability issues [19].
To gain a better understanding of the current state of sandboxes, some currently
available sandboxes and research sandboxes will be presented. Since the sandbox being
developed for this paper is an OS level sandbox, only sandboxes that operate at this level
will be presented. Much research has been conducted on sandboxes in the academic
world. The most common approach is for the sandbox to monitor system calls and
determine their actions based on them. Sandboxes such as [27] and [29] generate a model
to represent the sequence of system calls a program makes, and then if the program
deviates from the model it prevents the action. Sandboxes such as [16], [28], and [43]
extend this approach to not only look at the system calls a program makes, but to look at
the effect they produce, such as the actions they take on files and registry keys; similarly,
[38] extends this approach to dynamically sandbox programs based on the data, and
source of the data, they access. Other research efforts go as far as running device drivers in
a virtualized environment to improve system security and reliability [49].
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In addition to research sandboxes, many production sandboxes have been created.
For the Unix and Linux OSs, and their many variants, there are three popular sandboxes:
Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux), AppArmor, and FreeBSD Jails. SELinux provides a
framework to enforce a security policy, which can limit the resources a process can access
based on mandatory access controls, which enforce access controls regardless of who the
user is (SELinux treats the “root” super-user the same as regular users) [45]. AppArmor is
an alternative to SELinux that also limits the resources, and the permissions to those
resources, that programs can access [7]. Another alternative, FreeBSD Jails restricts a
process to a given directory subtree and assigns each jail its own hostname and static IP
address. Furthermore, Jails can have their own set of users; however, these users are
restricted to the jailed environment, so even the root user inside of a jail cannot perform
operations outside of the jailed environment [40].
On the Windows platform, several companies produce sandboxes: Comodo Firewall,
avast! Pro Antivirus, and Sandboxie. Comodo Firewall contains a sandbox that
automatically sandboxes programs. Comodo maintains a list of known safe programs and
known malware. Comodo Firewall allows programs on the known safe programs list to
run outside the sandbox and removes programs that are on the known malware list [11].
avast! Pro Antivirus does not automatically sandbox programs, but allows users to run
programs in a virtual (sandboxed) environment and prompts users to do so for suspicious
programs [9]. Sandboxie takes a different approach than the previous two, it focuses on
preventing sandboxed programs from making permanent changes to the system by
intercepting changes the sandboxed programs make and redirects them to the sandbox
environment. This allows Sandboxie to delete any changes the sandboxed program makes
to the system [21].
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2.1 Windows 7 32-bit in Detail
Windows 7 consists of many components that provide the services and functionality
essential for the OS. These components reside in both user and kernel mode, as shown in
Figure 2.1. Due to hardware and software protections, user mode code cannot directly
access kernel mode memory, while kernel mode code can directly access user mode
memory. Furthermore, code running in one process cannot directly access the memory of
another process, unless the other process allows it, such as through shared memory. Each
user mode component, as well as each user mode program, runs in its own process.
The Object Manager (OM) manages and facilitates access to all the objects on the
system, which represent system resources. The Security Reference Monitor (SRM)
provides the infrastructure to secure the objects. All other components rely on these two
components to interact with system resources in a secure manner [30].
2.1.1 Security Reference Monitor. Windows 7 32-bit uses a user-based security
model, implemented by the SRM, where each user has a set of actions they are allowed to
take, such as reading a file or writing a registry key. The SRM uses access tokens, Token
objects, to determine the actions a process can take. Access tokens are created when a user
logs on and contains the security identifier (SID) of the account for the user and any
groups the user belongs to. SIDs uniquely identify users and groups on the system. When
an user starts a process, the process receives the access token for the user. Therefore, each
process a user starts has the full rights of the user by default, although restricted access
tokens can be given to a process [36].
Every securable object has a Discretionary Access Control List (DACL) that lists the
access rights the various SIDs can have over the object. The DACL consists of a set of
Access Control Entrys (ACEs). Each ACE contains the allowed or denied access rights for
a SID. When a process wants to access an object, it indicates the access rights it wants
7
Figure 2.1: Windows Architecture [41, Figure 2-3]
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over the object with an access mask. In order to determine whether the access rights
should be allowed, the SRM compares the SIDs that apply to the process to the DACL of
the object the process wants to access and determines whether or not the access, as
indicated by the access mask, should be allowed [36].
Figure 2.2: Access Mask Structure [5]
Table 2.1: Generic Rights [5]
Generic Right Name Generic Right Mapping
GENERIC READ Rights to read the object
GENERIC WRITE Rights to write the object
GENERIC EXECUTE Rights to execute, or alternatively view, the
object
GENERIC ALL Rights to read, write, and execute the object
MAXIMUM ALLOWED [51] Grants the maximum allowed access rights
when making an access check
ACCESS SYSTEM SECURITY [42] Set or read the SACL in the security descrip-
tor of an object
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Table 2.2: Standard Rights [5]
Standard Right Name Allowed Action
SYNCHRONIZE Wait on the object
WRITE OWNER Modify the owner SID of the object
WRITE DAC Modify the security information for the object
READ CONTROL Read the security information for the object
DELETE Delete the object
Access masks, a 32-bit field, indicate the desired access rights a process wants over
an object. Access masks have three fields, as depicted in Figure 2.2: generic, standard,
and specific. Each generic access right maps to a set of standard and specific rights; the
mapping depends on the object type. Table 2.1 lists the meaning of each generic right
field. Table 2.2 describes the standard Rights, rights common to all object types. The
specific rights depend on the object type and are described below, for the object types that
are pertinent to this paper.
2.1.2 Object Manager [41, p. 133-170]. The OM in the Windows 7 OS, as well as
others, provides a common and centralized method for the kernel to manage access to all
system resources. The OM represents system resources as objects. In this instance, an
object is a data structure that contains pertinent information about a resource, not an
object in the object-oriented programming sense. The OM retains the object structures, in
memory, until no process requires access to them and provides a way to access objects by
name. Each object consists of a header and a body. The header contains information
common to all objects. There are many object types that represent various types of
resources (files, keys, synchronization primitives, etc.). The object body is specific to, and
the same for, each object type; it contains information common to each object of the
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corresponding object type. The OM uses the header to manage all objects in a uniform
manner. Each object type is implemented by an executive component, which uses the
object body to manage the objects of the type it implements.
Figure 2.3: Handle Structure [41, Figure 3-19]
The object data structures reside in kernel space and are accessed in two ways: by
pointer or by handle. User-mode processes access objects by handle, while processes in
kernel-mode can access objects by pointer or by handle. A kernel-mode process can
determine the location of the object structure without the aid of the OM, so it can access
any object without access checks; however, when an object is accessed by pointer, through
the OM, the OM retains the object until access is no longer required. A handle is an
executive structure, depicted in Figure 2.3, that the OM uses to determine the location of
the object being accessed and the access rights a process possesses over an object
(determined by the ACCESS MASK field). The other fields of the handle structure are
not important to this research. When a kernel mode process accesses an object by handle,
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the process receives a pointer to the object, the process can decide whether or not the
access check should be conducted, and the OM retains the object until it is no longer being
accessed. When an user mode process accesses an object by handle, the user mode process
passes a handle to the object, and the actions to be performed, to the kernel, then the kernel
conducts the actions on the object, if the user mode process has sufficient permissions.
When access to a resource is requested, if there is not already an object that
represents it, one is created. The object is kept until all processes indicate that they no
longer need access to the object, at which time the object is deleted. A process can receive
a handle to an object, and thereby have access to it, in one of three ways: when the process
creates the object, by opening an object by name, and by receiving a duplicate handle
from a process that already has a handle to the object (occurs when one process inherits
handles from another process or when one process explicitly duplicates a handle and gives
it to another process). Two processes share an object when both open the same object by
name or when one process receives a handle from the other process through duplication.
2.1.2.1 Object Manager Directory. The OM organizes all the named objects
into a directory structure, as depicted in Figure 2.4, that is much like a file system, and is
referred to as the OM namespace. All named objects, except Key, File, and Process
objects, have their names in the OM namespace. Whenever an object is referenced by
name, the name of the object is passed to the OM, which then traverses the directory until
it either finds the object or determines that the object does not exist in the OM namespace.
While Key and File object names are not in the OM namespace, their names are rooted
there. When a Key or File object is referenced by name, the name of the Key or File object
is passed to the OM, which traverses the OM namespace portion of the object name then
passes the rest of the object name to the appropriate component: the Configuration
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Figure 2.4: Object Manager Directory Structure [41, 33, Table 3-14]
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Manager for Key objects and the File Manager for File objects. The Key and File object
name lookups will be further detailed below in the object type descriptions.
2.1.2.2 Object Header. The Object Header provides information common to
every object. The OM uses this structure to manage all the objects in a general manner. As
shown in Figure 2.5, the object header contains eleven mandatory fields and five optional
headers. The object header immediately precedes the object body of the object that it
refers to. The optional fields included with a specific object header are indicated by the
InfoMask field, as described below, and they immediately precede the mandatory fields in
the order indicated in Figure 2.5. Below are the descriptions of each field [53, 41,
p. 139-140].
PointerCount and HandleCount The OM uses PointerCount and HandleCount to
determine when it is safe to delete an object. When a resource is referenced, and
there is no object that represents it, the OM creates one. Each object is retained until
both PointerCount and HandleCount are zero, at which time the OM deletes the
object. When the object is referenced or dereferenced by pointer the OM increments
or decrements, respectively, PointerCount. When the object is referenced or
dereferenced by handle the OM increments or decrements, respectively, both
PointerCount and HandleCount. So PointerCount is a count of the number of
pointer and handle references to the object, while HandleCount is only a count of
the number of handle references to the object.
NextToFree This field is undocumented.
Lock A per-object lock used to ensure the object structure is not modified by two
processes at the same time.
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Figure 2.5: The Object Header Structure
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-Ox008 OBJECT HEADER PROCESS INFO 
+OxOOO ExclusiveProcess: Ptr32 EPROCESS -
+Ox004 Reserved: Uint4B 
-Ox010 OBJECT HEADER QUOTA INFO 
+OxOOO PagedPooiCharge : Uint4B 
+Ox004 NonPagedPooiCharge : Uint4B 
+Ox008 SecurityDescriptorCharge : Uint4B 
+OxOOc SecurityDescriptorQuotaBiock : Ptr32 Void 
-Ox008 OBJECT HEADER HANDLE INFO 
+OxOOO HandleCountDataBase : Ptr32 -OBJECT_HANDLE_COUNT_DATABASE 
+OxOOO SingleEntry: _OBJECT_HANDLE_COUNT_ENTRY 
-Ox010 OBJECT HEADER NAME INFO 
+OxOOO Directory: Ptr32 _OBJECT_DIRECTORY 
+Ox004 Name: - UNICODE_ STRING 
+OxOOc ReferenceCount: lnt4B 
-Ox010 OBJECT HEADER CREATOR INFO 
+OxOOO Type list : _LIST _ENTRY 
+Ox008 CreatorUniqueProcess: Ptr32 Void 
+OxOOc CreatorBackTracelndex : Uint2B 
+OxOOe Reserved : Uint2B 
+OxOOO OBJECT HEADER 
+OxOOO PointerCount: lnt4B 
+Ox004 HandleCount: lnt4B 
+Ox004 NextToFree: Ptr32 
+Ox008 Lock: - EX_PUSH_LOCK 
+OxOOC Typelndex: UChar 
+OxOOD TraceFiags: UChar 
+OxOOE lnfoMask: UChar 
+OxOOF Flags: UChar 
+Ox010 ObjectCreatelnfo: Ptr32 - OBJECT_ CREATE_INFORMATION 
+Ox010 QuotaBiockCharged: Ptr32 
+Ox014 Secu rityDescri ptor: Ptr32 - SECURITY _DESCRIPTOR 
TypeIndex An index into a global array of pointers to the object types. The value in this
field indicates the object type of the object.
TraceFlags This field contains information related to tracing object references and
dereferences during debugging.
InfoMask This field indicates which optional headers, if any, are included with the object
header. The presence of each of the five optional headers is indicated by a bit in the
InfoMask field. The order of the included optional headers, as well as the position
of the corresponding bit (lowest to highest), are the same as Figure 2.5 indicates.
Below are the descriptions of each optional header:
Creator Information (Bit Pos 0) This optional header links the object to all other
objects of the same type and contains a pointer to the process that created the
object. This optional header is only included when the Type object for the
object has the MaintainTypeList flag set.
Name Information (Bit Pos 1) For objects created with a name, this optional
header contains the name of the object and a pointer to its place in the object
namespace.
Handle Information (Bit Pos 2) Contains a list of the processes that have a handle
to the object open. This header is only included when the Type object for the
object has the MaintainHandleCount flag set.
Quota Information (Bit Pos 3) This optional header contains the resource charges
against a process when it opens a handle to the object. This optional header is
included when the quota of the object differs from the default quota of the
object type and for other special cases.
Process Information (Bit Pos 4) This optional header is active if it is opened to be
exclusive to a single process and it contains a pointer to the process.
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Flags This is a set of attributes for the object that the OM uses to manage the object
internally. The flags are described in.
ObjectCreateInfo Maintains information about the process that created the object and a
list that links the object to other objects of the same type. This field is only valid
when the Type object for the object has the MaintainTypeList flag set.
QuotaBlockCharged Contains the resource charges against a process when it opens a
handle to the object. This field is valid when the quota of the object differs from the
default quota of the object type and for other special cases.
SecurityDescriptor This is a pointer to the permissions for this object and is only valid
for named objects.
2.1.2.3 Object Types. Since Windows represents every resource as an object,
there are many object types, because there are many types of resources. Object types are
themselves represented by the Type object, an object itself. Windows allows the creation
of object types through undocumented functions within the kernel. The Type object
contains information common to and aggregate statistics about all objects of that type,
information the OM requires in order to manage objects of that type, and default settings
for objects of that type. There are 42 object types by default; however, only 20 of them are
directly accessible in user mode through API functions [41, p. 136-137]. The object types
that are only directly available to the kernel are the following: Adapter, ALPC Port,
Callback, Controller, DebugObject, Device, Driver, EtwConsumer, EtwRegistration,
EventPair, FilterCommunicationPort, FilterConnectionPort, IoCompletionReserve,
KeyedEvent, PcwObject, PowerRequest, Profile, Session, SymbolicLink, Type,
UserApcReserve, WmiGuid. They are detailed below. Since this sandbox is intended to
only sandbox user-space programs, only the object types that are available in user-space
will be detailed.
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Directory Directory objects provide the directory structure for the OM in a similar way
as a directory in a file system; however, the OM directory structure is different and
independent from the file structure. Limiting the directories in the OM that a
process has access to can provide additional, although course, security. Table 2.3
lists the specific rights that apply to Directory objects.
Table 2.3: Directory Object Specific Rights [33, 3]





Object Directory Name Lookup
0x0004 DIRECTORY CREATE OBJECT
Object Directory Create Name
0x0008 DIRECTORY CREATE SUBDIRECTORY
Object Directory Create Subdirectory
0x000F DIRECTORY ALL ACCESS
All of the Object Directory Specific Rights
Synchronization Object (Event, Mutex, Semaphore, Timer) Synchronization objects
allow multiple threads to synchronize their execution, such as limiting the number
of threads that can concurrently execute a section of code. While synchronization
objects do not pose a direct security risk, that is they cannot allow access to
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resources a process should not have access to, they can lead to denial of service. A
compromise of a synchronization object can lead to a denial of service if the
compromise prevents a thread from executing when it should. While these object
types are specifically created for synchronization, other object types can facilitate
synchronization [2]. The specific rights that pertain to synchronization objects are
listed in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4: Synchronization Object Specific Rights [47, 3]
Access Mask Specific Right Name Specific Right Description
Event
0x0001 EVENT QUERY STATE Query Event Object State
0x0002 EVENT MODIFY STATE Modify Event Object State
Mutex
0x0001 MUTEX MODIFY STATE Modify Mutex Object State
Semaphore
0x0001 SEMAPHORE QUERY STATE Query Semaphore Object State
0x0002 SEMAPHORE MODIFY STATE Modify Semaphore Object State
Timer
0x0001 TIMER QUERY STATE Query Timer Object State
0x0002 Timer MODIFY STATE Modify Timer Object State
File The OM represents files, directories, and pipes with the File object. File objects do
not have a name in the OM namespace, but they do have an internal name in the File
object structure, which is the name of the file, directory, or pipe it represents. The
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internal name is anchored to the OM namespace by the name of the drive it resides
on, which is located in the \Device directory. Table 2.5 lists the specific rights for
File objects.
Table 2.5: File Object Specific Rights [54, 12, 3]
Access
Mask Type Specific Right Name Specific Right Description
0x0001 F, P FILE READ DATA Read Data from the File / Pipe
D FILE LIST DIRECTORY List the Files in the Directory
0x0002 F, P FILE WRITE DATA Write Data to the File / Pipe
D FILE ADD FILE Add Files to the Directory
0x0004 F FILE APPEND DATA Append Data to the File
D FILE ADD SUBDIRECTORY Add Directories to the Direc-
tory
P FILE CREATE PIPE INSTANCE Create a Named Pipe Instance
0x0008 F, D FILE READ EA Read Extended Attributes
0x0010 F, D FILE WRITE EA Write Extended Attributes
0x0020 F FILE EXECUTE Read File Data Into Memory
D FILE TRAVERSE Traverse the Directory
0x0040 D FILE DELETE CHILD Delete a File or Directory
from the Directory
0x0080 A FILE READ ATTRIBUTES Read the Attributes of the File
0x0100 A FILE WRITE ATTRIBUTES Write the Attributes of the File
F: File D: Directory P: Pipe
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IoCompletion This object provides a mechanism to alert processes when an I/O
operation finishes. Therefore, this object does not need additional protections, since
the I/O operations are protected [22].
Job Job objects provide a mechanism to manage processes as a group, such as setting
security attributes, suspending them, terminating them, etc. Job objects only group
processes, which have their own security, so if the processes are secured, the job
objects do not need to be secured [25].
Key The Key object represents registry keys and Table 2.6 contains the specific rights for
Key objects. Key objects, like File objects do not have a name in the OM
namespace, rather they have their own internal name. The OM directory has a Key
object attached to the root of the directory named \Registry. To lookup a registry
key by name, the OM receives the name of the key from the Configuration
Manager (CM) (the component responsible for the registry) and starts looking up
the name. It first encounters the Key named \Registry, at which time it sends the
rest of the name of the key to the CM to finish the lookup.
Figure 2.6: Key Object Related Structures Required for Key Name Lookup
As indicated above, there are two levels for registry keys: the OM level and the CM
level. The Key object, called CM KEY BODY in Figure 2.6, refers to a specific
registry key, while the CM KEY CONTROL BLOCK and the
CM NAME CONTROL BLOCK refer to a subkey. Each CM KEY CONTROL BLOCK points
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Figure 2.7: Example of the Relationship of the Key Object Related Structures
to the next subkey of its name; keys that have common beginning key names share
CM KEY CONTROL BLOCKs for the shared subkeys. For example, as depicted in
Figure 2.7, there is a Key object, CM KEY BODY, for each of the three registry keys:
\Registry\SubKey1, \Registry\SubKey1\SubKey2, and
\Registry\SubKey1\SubKey3. Each of the three Key objects point to a different
CM KEY CONTROL BLOCK, but have the SubKey1 and \Registry
CM KEY CONTROL BLOCK in common in their chain. Finally, the key name is
anchored in the root directory of the OM [41, p. 276-277].
Process The Process object contains the information needed to manage processes. When
a process creates another process, it receives a handle to the new process with full
access rights. The specific rights for the Process object are in Table 2.7.
Section Section objects contain the necessary information to manage a section of
memory. A memory section can map to a file or to the page file. Furthermore,
processes can share access to memory sections through views. Views allow a
process to access a portion of a memory section and defines what actions a process
can take on that portion of memory [44]. Table 2.8 lists the specific rights for
Section objects.
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Table 2.6: Key Object Specific Rights [39]
Access Mask Specific Right Name Specific Right Description
0x0001 KEY QUERY VALUE Query Registry Key Values
0x0002 KEY SET VALUE Create, Delete, or Set Registry
Key Values
0x0004 KEY CREATE SUB KEY Create a Subkey of a Registry
Key
0x0008 KEY ENUMERATE SUB KEYS Enumerate the Subkeys of a
Registry Key
0x0010 KEY NOTIFY Allows Receipt of Change
Notifications for a Registry
Key or its SubKeys
0x0020 KEY CREATE LINK Reserved for system use
0x0100 KEY WOW64 64KEY Indicates a 64-bit application
should operate on the 64-bit
registry view - ignored by 32-
bit Windows
0x0200 KEY WOW64 32KEY Indicates a 64-bit application
should operate on the 64-bit
registry view - ignored by 32-
bit Windows
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Table 2.7: Process Object Specific Rights [35, 3]
Access Mask Specific Right Name Specific Right Description
0x0001 PROCESS TERMINATE Terminate the process
0x0002 PROCESS CREATE THREAD Create a thread associated
with the process
0x0004 PROCESS SET SESSIONID
0x0008 PROCESS VM OPERATION Modify the address space of
the process
0x0010 PROCESS VM READ Read from the address space
of the process
0x0020 PROCESS VM WRITE Write to the address space of
the process
0x0040 PROCESS DUP HANDLE Duplicate handles to or from
the process
0x0080 PROCESS CREATE PROCESS Create a child process of the
process
0x0100 PROCESS SET QUOTA Set the working set size for the
process
0x0200 PROCESS SET INFORMATION Modify process settings
0x0400 PROCESS QUERY INFORMATION Query process settings
0x0800 PROCESS SUSPEND RESUME Suspend or resume the pro-
cess
0x1000 PROCESS QUERY LIMITED INFORMATION
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Table 2.8: Section Object Specific Rights [55, 3]
Access Mask Specific Right Name Specific Right Description
0x0001 SECTION QUERY Query the Section object for
information about the section
0x0002 SECTION MAP WRITE Write views of the section
0x0004 SECTION MAP READ Read views of the section
0x0008 SECTION MAP EXECUTE Execute views of the section
0x0010 SECTION EXTEND SIZE Dynamically extend the sec-
tion size
0x0020 SECTION MAP EXECUTE EXPLICIT
Undocumented
Thread The Thread object represents information required for the system to manage the
thread. Threads share the handle table of the process they are associated with;
however, a thread can gain access to more objects than their associated process
through impersonation tokens and a process can create a thread in the context of
another process. The ability for a process to make the previous changes, and others,
are specified through the specific rights for Thread objects and are detailed in
Table 2.9.
Kernel Transaction Objects (Enlistment, Resource Manager, Transaction Manager,
Transaction) The Kernel Transaction Manager provides support for executing
multiple operations as an atomic transaction. Transactions allow multiple operations
to be conducted so that if any of the operations fail, all of the operations are undone.
These objects provide the kernel level support for this functionality [41, p. 240-241].
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Table 2.9: Thread Object Specific Rights [35, 50, 3]
Access Mask Specific Right Name Specific Right Description
0x0001 THREAD TERMINATE Terminate the thread
0x0002 THREAD SUSPEND RESUME Suspend or resume the thread
0x0004 THREAD ALERT Undocumented
0x0008 THREAD GET CONTEXT Query the execution context
of the thread
0x0010 THREAD SET CONTEXT Modify the execution context
of the thread
0x0020 THREAD SET INFORMATION Modify the thread settings
0x0040 THREAD QUERY INFORMATION Query the thread settings
0x0080 THREAD SET THREAD TOKEN Set the impersonation token
for a thread
0x0100 THREAD IMPERSONATE Directly use the security infor-
mation of a thread
0x0200 THREAD DIRECT IMPERSONATION
Allows a server thread to im-
personate a client
0x0400 THREAD SET LIMITED INFORMATION
Modify a limited set of thread
settings
0x0800 THREAD QUERY LIMITED INFORMATION
Query a limited set of thread
settings
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Since transactions are wrappers for other operations, no additional security must be
applied to them, since the operations themselves possess their own security.
Token Token objects contain the access control lists, security identifiers, and other items
the SRM requires to enforce user-based security. A process can alter the contents of
a Token, thereby altering the permissions a process has over an object [36].
Therefore, the actions a process can take on a Token object must be controlled and
the specific rights are defined in Table 2.10.
TpWorkerFactory The TpWorkerFactory is an object for kernel level support for thread
pools. Thread pools allow a process to create a dynamic number of threads, that are
managed by the kernel. Since the TpWorkerFactory is essentially a container for
threads, much the same way as a Job object is a container for processes, additional
security is not needed [41, p. 386-390].
WindowStation and Desktop Window stations contain a clipboard, an atom table, and a
set of Desktop objects. There is only one interactive window station per session
called WinSta0. An atom table is a 16-bit integer, atom, to string look-up table [1].
Each Window Station has three Desktops by default: the logon desktop, the default
desktop, and the screensaver desktop. Each Desktop has a set of windows.
Processes on a Desktop can only communicate with other processes on the same
Desktop, through the Desktop mechanisms, such as Window messages. Window
Stations and Desktops do not allow processes on them to communicate between
separate Window Stations and Desktops; however, processes can control the
Window Station or Desktop they are on and can affect other processes on the same
Window Station or Desktop, so the access rights a process has to a Window Station
or Desktop must be controlled [4]. The specific rights for WindowStation objects
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Table 2.10: Token Object Specific Rights [6, 3]
Access Mask Specific Right Name Specific Right Description
0x0001 TOKEN ASSIGN PRIMARY Attach a primary token to the
process
0x0002 TOKEN DUPLICATE Duplicate the access token
0x0004 TOKEN IMPERSONATE Attach an impersonation to-
ken to the process
0x0008 TOKEN QUERY Query the access token
0x0010 TOKEN QUERY SOURCE Query the source of the access
token
0x0020 TOKEN ADJUST PRIVILEGES Enable or disable the privi-
leges in the access token
0x0040 TOKEN ADJUST GROUPS Adjust the attributes of the
groups in the access token
0x0080 TOKEN ADJUST DEFAULT Change the default owner, pri-
mary group, or DACL of the
access token
0x0100 TOKEN ADJUST SESSIONID Adjust the session ID of the
access token
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are defined in Table 2.11 and the specific rights for Desktop objects are defined in
Table 2.12.
Table 2.11: WindowStation Object Specific Rights [3]
Access Mask Specific Right Name Specific Right Description
0x0001 WINSTA ENUMDESKTOPS Enumerate existing Desktop
objects
0x0002 WINSTA READATTRIBUTES Read the attributes of the Win-
dowStation object
0x0004 WINSTA ACCESSCLIPBOARD Use the clipboard
0x0008 WINSTA CREATEDESKTOP Create a Desktop object on the
Window Station
0x0010 WINSTA WRITEATTRIBUTES Modify the attributes of the
WindowStation object
0x0020 WINSTA ACCESSGLOBALATOMS Modify global atoms
0x0040 WINSTA EXITWINDOWS Close the Window Station or
shutdown the system
0x0100 WINSTA ENUMERATE Enumerate the Window Sta-
tion
0x0200 WINSTA READSCREEN Access screen contents
2.1.2.4 Object Manager Callbacks. Starting in Windows Vista, and
continuing with Windows 7, Microsoft added callback function capabilities to the OM.
The callbacks allow a function to be called before or after an object is created or
duplicated. The standard functionality only allows callback functions to be registered for
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Table 2.12: Desktop Object Specific Rights
Access Mask Specific Right Name Specific Right Description
0x0001 DESKTOP READOBJECTS Read objects on the desktop
0x0002 DESKTOP CREATEWINDOW Create a window on the desk-
top
0x0004 DESKTOP CREATEMENU Create a menu on the desktop
0x0008 DESKTOP HOOKCONTROL Establish one of the window
hooks
0x0010 DESKTOP JOURNALRECORD Perform journal recording on
the desktop
0x0020 DESKTOP JOURNALPLAYBACK Perform journal playback on
the desktop
0x0040 DESKTOP ENUMERATE Enumerate the desktop
0x0080 DESKTOP WRITEOBJECTS Write objects on the desktop
0x0100 DESKTOP SWITCHDESKTOP Activate the desktop
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Figure 2.8: Functions and Data Structures of the Object Manager Callbacks
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Process and Thread objects; however, any object type can be enabled to have callbacks
registered for it by setting the SupportsObjectCallbacks bit in the OBJECT TYPE structure
for that object to one. The OM callbacks allow the restriction of the access rights a
process receives over an object, but does not allow the object access to be directly blocked
(it can be indirectly blocked by removing all access rights).
To use the OM callback functionality, one must register a pre or post callback
function with the ObRegisterCallbacks function. The ObRegisterCallbacks function has
an OB CALLBACK REGISTRATION structure as input, as shown in Figure 2.8, which
contains a pointer to an array of OB OPERATION REGISTRATION structures. Each
OB OPERATION REGISTRATION structure contains fields that indicate when the callbacks
are triggered: the object type the callback function(s) are called for, whether the
function(s) are called before or after the operation, and whether the function(s) should be
called when a handle to the object is created or duplicated. In addition, the structure
contains the function that should be called for each object type before and after the
operation (if a function should not be called, the corresponding field is set to NULL).
The main difference between the callback functions lies between the
ObjectPreCallback and ObjectPostCallback functions and the create and duplicate
modes of the ObjectPreCallback function. The ObjectPreCallback function contain two
ACCESS MASKs, one for the original access the process desires for the object
(OriginalDesiredAccess) and the access the filter allows the process to the object
(DesiredAccess; the DesiredAccess must have a subset of the access rights in
OriginalDesiredAccess). The ObjectPostCallback function contains one ACCESS MASK
for the actual access granted to the process for the object. Within the ObjectPreCallback
function, the OB PRE DUPLICATE HANDLE INFORMATION structure contains a pointer to
the process that the handle is being copied from and the process that it is being copied to;
the OB PRE CREATE HANDLE INFORMATION structure does not.
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3 Methodology
Magnesium Object Manager Sandbox (MOMS) monitors and restricts objects that
programs, such as Internet Explorer, access. The term program, in this case, refers to all
the processes that are required for what a normal user conceptually views as a program to
run. MOMS contains a list of all the programs, the Program Watch List (PWL), it should
sandbox. Each program in the PWL has a main process, the process used to start the
program; for example, “iexplore.exe” is the main process for Internet Explorer. For each
program in the PWL, MOMS maintains a list of the processes, Associated Process
List (APL), associated with the program.
MOMS has two modes of operation: the Rules Generation Mode (RGM) and the
Enforcement Mode (EnfM). The RGM determines the resources each program wants
access to and runs on an administration computer, a computer with Windows 7 32-bit free
of viruses or any other code unintended to be executed. The RGM produces a list of the
objects, the Operation Record List (ORL), and corresponding access rights, a program
accesses by monitoring handle creation and duplication with the OM callback
functionality. The EnfM runs on production computers with Windows 7 32-bit installed. It
uses the same OM callback functionality that the RGM uses to monitor handle creation
and duplication requests; instead of logging each request, for each process in the APL, it
limits the access rights the process receives over the object to those in the Object Allow
List (OAL), which is based on the ORL.
Of the 42 object types present in Windows 7 32-bit, thirteen of them are monitored
by MOMS: Directory, Event, Mutex, Semaphore, Timer, File, Key, Process, Section,
Thread, Token, WindowStation, and Desktop. The other object types are not monitored
because they are either not available to user mode, since the API does not make them
available [41, Table 3-5], or they are used to manage other object types that are monitored,
such as Job objects.
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This section discusses the goals of the individual components of MOMS and the
approaches to evaluate those goals.
3.1 Goals and Approaches
The goal of this research is to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of MOMS.
The RGM sacrifices some speed for efficient object access storage by updating the
ACCESS MASK for objects in the access list, in linear time based on the number of objects
in the ORL; therefore, the RGM should run efficiently. The EnfM maximizes both
effectiveness and efficiency. The EnfM intercepts each request for access to resources and
allows or restricts the request based on the OAL. The request interception runs in constant
time and the access check runs in linear time based on the number of objects in the OAL
of the program. Since the RGM and EnfM run in linear time and checks each access
request, MOMS is expected to be efficient as a whole and effective at preventing payloads
associated with exploits from running.
3.1.1 Efficient Operation. To be practical and accepted, the RGM and the EnfM
must not add an excessive overhead, a noticeable slowdown, to the operation of the
system. Since the operation of the RGM and the EnfM are very similar, the RGM logs
access requests and the EnfM allows or restricts access requests, the performance of the
EnfM will be very similar to that of the RGM. Therefore, the efficiency of MOMS will be
determined by comparing the performance, the execution time or speed, of a set of
programs in and out of the RGM, with varying hardware.
3.1.2 Accurate Object Allow List. Another goal for the RGM is that it generates
an accurate OAL. This is essential because the security of the system depends on this and
less manual configuration is required. To test this goal, a set of programs are ran in and
out of the EnfM with the OAL. The accuracy is determined by the number of exploits
whose payloads successfully execute without the EnfM versus with the EnfM.
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3.1.3 Ensure the Enforcement Mode Cannot be Circumvented. The last goal
ensures the EnfM cannot be circumvented via side channels. For MOMS, a side channel
exists when a process can access an object it should not be able to, or in a way it should
not be able to, by altering the system in a way that makes MOMS determine the access
should be allowed. This goal cannot be fully evaluated with current software because
although MOMS could prevent software from using side channels that were written
without considering this sandbox, there could be an easily exploitable flaw in MOMS that
would render the sandbox ineffective. Therefore, MOMS is evaluated analytically
identifying potential vulnerabilities in MOMS and then determining the impact they may
have, as well as any possible mitigations for them.
3.2 System Under Test
The system under test (Figure 3.1), MOMS, consists of two Components Under Test
(CUT), the RGM and the EnfM, as well as two supporting components, the administration
computer and the production computer.
3.2.1 Associated Process List Generation. The APL contains the Process
Identifiers (PIDs) that are associated with the main process. A PID is a numerical unique
identifier for processes. Also, each Process object contains the PID of the process that
created it, the parent of the process. Whenever a handle to a Process object is created or
duplicated, the PID of that process is added to the APL of a watched process if the name
of the process is the same as the name of the main process or if the PID of the parent of
the process is in the APL. Processes are added to the APL in this fashion, because this
method associates any process that a main process starts, directly or indirectly, with the
main process.
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Figure 3.1: Magnesium Object Manager Sandbox
3.2.2 Rules Generation Mode. In the RGM, an ORL is maintained for each
program in the PWL. For create operations, if the process creating the handle (the current
process) is in the APL of a PWL, the operation is added to the ORL of that program. For
duplicate operations, if the process the handle is being duplicated to is in the APL of a
PWL, and it is not being duplicated from a process in the same APL, the operation is
added to the ORL of that program. If the handle is being duplicated from a process in the
APL, the operation is not added to the ORL of that program because the program would
already have access to the object in order to be able to duplicate a handle to the object. If
the object already exists in the list, the ACCESS MASK of the object is OR’ed with the
ACCESS MASK of the object already in the list. Unnamed objects are not included in the
ORL. This produces a list of the objects the program accesses along with a ACCESS MASK
that includes all the possible ACCESS MASKs the program needs.
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3.2.3 Enforcement Mode. In the EnfM, MOMS references an OAL to determine if
an operation should occur. The OAL consists of the objects in the ORL, with more or
fewer objects, or reduced or increased access rights. The decision of whether to restrict,
deny, or allow, an operation depends on the process that receives the handle and, for
handle duplication, the process that the handle originates from. If the process that receives
the handle is not in an APL, the operation is allowed, since the process is not being
sandboxed. For create operations, if the object has a name, the operation is restricted to
those that are in the OAL of the program that the process receiving the handle belongs to.
If the object does not have a name, the operation is allowed. For duplicate operations, the
operation is allowed in the following scenarios:
1. the process the handle originates from and the process that receives the handle are in
the APL of the same program,
2. if the object has a name, the operation is restricted to those in the OAL of the
program,
3. if the object does not have a name, the handle originates from the parent process of
the process that receives the handle or if the process that the handle originates from
is a system process, such as explorer.exe or svchost.exe.
When an operation is restricted to the objects in an OAL, if the name of the object is in the
OAL, the ACCESS MASK is limited by the ACCESS MASK in the OAL; otherwise, all rights
in the ACCESS MASK are removed. The EnfM also ensures a process does not access an
object it should not have access to through an object it should, such as an object that is a
hard, or symbolic, link.
This algorithm ensures each program does not access a named object it should not
and that unnamed objects do not cross the program boundary. Unnamed objects are
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allowed to be duplicated from a process to its child process, or from a system process,
without restriction because this is required for normal operation.
3.3 System Services
MOMS provides two main services: generation of the OAL and the enforcement of
it. The sandbox administrator generates the OAL based on the ORL produced by the
RGM. The OALs used for these tests are minimally altered versions of the ORLs
generated by the RGM. Minimal alterations consist of changes such as allowing access to
temporary directories instead of specific files in those directories. The EnfM enforces the
OAL, therefore it depends directly on the OAL. The two services will not be tested
separately, the combined effect of them will be tested. The two services are tested by
running an exploit against a sandboxed program and recording whether the associated
payload succeeds or fails to execute. The outcomes of the test for the two services are:
Success: the payload is not able to execute
Failure: the payload is able to execute
3.4 Workload
To test MOMS, a set of programs will be used, along with associated program tasks.
The performance metrics, especially the performance metrics measuring efficiency,
depend on the particular program and program task being used.
Program The performance of a program depends on the details of that program, such as
the amount of input and output operations it does and the amount of memory it uses.
More specific to MOMS, the number of total handle create and duplicate operations
and the number of unique objects the program requests a handle to affects the
performance of the program, since the higher either of them are, the more work
MOMS must do.
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Program Task The performance of an individual program not only depends on the
individual program, but also on the task it is doing, such as the document it is
opening.
3.5 Performance Metrics
There are two main performance metrics that measure the performance of MOMS
and determine whether the goals for the system have been achieved:
Efficiency of the RGM and the EnfM Determined by the execution time or execution
speed of a set of programs with and without the RGM,
Effectiveness of the RGM and the EnfM Determined by the success or failure of the
payload of a associated with an exploit.
3.6 System Parameters
The two CUTs have many system parameters in common and are therefore listed
together.
Number of Processor Cores: This parameter includes the total number of cores:
whether they are on different physical processors within the same computer, on the
same physical processor, or some combination. The number of processor cores
affects the performance of multi-threaded programs and the performance of
programs that run at the same time as other programs.
Processor Speed (Clock Frequency): The processor speed affects the speed that
programs run at, that is the higher the processor speed, the lower the execution time
of the program.
Memory Size: Memory size is important because access lists can get large enough that
they do not fit in available memory and may need to be stored on the hard drive. The
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more memory the system has the less the processor must go to the hard drive to
retrieve the data.
Memory Speed: Memory Speed is important because faster memory can respond to
processor requests quicker and therefore the faster the program runs.
Hard Drive Speed: There are two types of drives: hard drives (HDs) and solid state
drives (SSDs). The speed of HDs are reported as the number of revolutions per
minute they make. The speed of SSDs are reported as how much data they can read
or write per second. The HD speed can have an important role if the processor has
to wait on the HD for data.
3.7 System Factors and Levels
Since the RGM and the EnfM are very similar and they will run on similar machines,
the same factors and levels pertain to both of them or neither of them. Table 3.1 contains
the system factors that are considered when testing MOMS and the corresponding levels
that are considered when evaluating MOMS.
The Program being ran and the Program Task are included as factors because they
can affect the efficiency of the system. The levels chosen for the Program being ran are
chosen to represent the kinds of programs someone would use on a daily basis.
Benchmarks are not used so that the effectiveness of MOMS, at preventing the payload of
an exploit from successfully executing, can be tested with the same programs that are used
for efficiency testing. The levels chosen for the Program Task are chosen for each
Program in order to exercise some of the functionality of the program. For 7-Zip 9.20, the
first task is performing compression and the second task is performing decompression.
Each task is opening a web page, for Internet Explorer 8. For the rest of the programs,
each task is opening an appropriate document.
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The Number of Processor Cores is included because access checks could become a
bottle neck if the system has to wait for too many checks and the more cores there are the
less of a concern this is. The levels, one and two cores, are chosen. Memory Size is often
an important factor for system performance, which is important for the EnfM. Two levels
are chosen for the memory size: 2 GBs because it is a common size for basic systems
running Windows 7 and 3 GBs because it is the maximum available on the computer used
for testing. The number of cores, and the available memory are controlled with the
Windows boot options, the underlying hardware of a two core processor and 4 GBs of
installed physical memory did not change.
The Processor Speed is not a factor because it does not have a significant impact
when compared to the micro-architecture of the processor and the number of cores. In
addition, Memory Speed is not a factor because there is not a significant enough a
difference between the speeds found in most workplace computers for it to be an
important factor. Due to the relatively small size of MOMS, HD Speed should not have a
significant impact on the operation of MOMS.
3.8 Evaluation Techniques
Two different evaluation techniques are used to fully evaluate MOMS: measurement
of a real system and analytical modeling.
Measurement of a real system evaluates the performance of MOMS and its
effectiveness against current attacks. To evaluate the performance of MOMS, the
programs in Table 3.1 are used. There are 250 repetitions of each task for each program,
which should meet the statistical requirements in Section 3.9. Each program is run a total
of 250 times, because when each program was run for 100 repetitions, initially, the
resulting data was not normally distributed, so they were run an additional 150 times in an
attempt to get more normally distributed data.
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Microsoft Power Point 2007
Microsoft Word 2007
Program Task Task 1
Task 2
Number of Processor Cores 1 core
2 cores
Memory Size 2 GB
3 GB
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A single test run of a program consists of running the program for each task. The
program opens the first task, an appropriate document or web page, and closes it, then it
opens and closes the second task. The execution time is the total amount of time that
passes from when the program is told to open the task to when the program has exited.
The execution time for the first task and the second task are recorded as the performance
metrics for the program. An exception, to evaluate 7-Zip 9.20, the built in benchmark is
used. The built in benchmark measures the compression and decompression speeds in
KB/s and runs for the number of desired repetitions. The compression speed is recorded
as the performance metric, execution speed, for the first task and the decompression speed
is recorded as the performance metric for the second task.
A complete test run of a program consists of running the single test run for the
program for the number of desired repetitions plus one; the first single test run is ignored,
since there is too much variability in the performance metrics for the first run. A system
test run consists of running the complete test run of each program in succession. Each
system test run is run without and with the RGM.
The evaluation of the RGM and the EnfM is in two parts: evaluation of its
effectiveness against current attacks and an analysis of its effectiveness against future
attacks designed to circumvent it. To evaluate its effectiveness against current attacks, a
set of exploits is used, along with appropriate payloads. Malware is composed of two
main components: the exploit, which uses a vulnerability in a program to execute some
arbitrary code, and the payload, which is the arbitrary code an exploit executes. The OALs
are tuned as if they are going to be deployed in a production environment. The exploits are
then run and whether the associated payload successfully executes is recorded. To
evaluate the effectiveness of the EnfM against future attacks designed to circumvent it, an
analysis is done on the EnfM to determine potential vulnerabilities that may be exploited.
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3.9 Experimental Design
The experimental design evaluates the efficiency and effectiveness of the RGM and
EnfM. The efficiency measurements depend on the execution time of the RGM and the
EnfM which is a probabilistic measurement, so some repetitions are required. In addition,
the factors related to the efficiency have a lot of interaction and there are not many
factors/levels, so a full factorial design is appropriate. Since the timing of the CUTs are
not critical (they have to be fast enough so people will use them) a confidence level of
90% is appropriate. The tests to determine the effectiveness of the RGM and EnfM will be
reported without statistical analysis, since they are deterministic results, so no repetitions
are required, and there are not many results.
3.10 Summary
MOMS consists of two main components, RGM and EnfM, and two secondary
components, Administration Computer and Production Computer. The RGM runs on the
Administration Computer and the EnfM runs on the Production Computer. There are two
metrics used to evaluate this system: the efficiency of the RGM on the Administration
Computer and the combined accuracy of the RGM and the EnfM. To evaluate the system
based on these metrics a set of representative programs will be run on different
configurations of the system to determine the efficiency of MOMS and the effectiveness of
MOMS against current threats. To evaluate the accuracy of the EnfM against future
threats designed to circumvent it, an analytical evaluation approach is used. The
confidence level for the efficiencies only needs to be 90%, since the system only needs to
be fast enough that people will use it.
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4 Results and Discussion
This chapter determines the impact the RGM has on the performance of the system
and the effect the hardware configuration, the Number of Processor Cores and the
Memory Size factors, has on performance. In addition, the effectiveness of MOMS in
sandboxing programs will be determined in this chapter as well.
To determine the effect MOMS has on the performance of the system, the
performance metrics for each factor level combination without the RGM, the base system,
will be compared with the performance metrics for the same factor level combination with
the RGM. For each comparison, the Wilcoxon signed rank test will be used, which is the
Mann-Whitney U test for paired groups. The paired groups version of the Mann-Whitney
U test is used, because the performance data for with and without MOMS is dependent on
each other; the performance of the system with MOMS depends on the base system, since
the better or worse the base system performs, the better or worse the system with MOMS
performs [26, p. 165]. The Wilcoxon signed rank test, a non-parametric test (it does not
assume the data conforms to a particular distribution), will be used instead of a parametric
test like the t-test, because the underlying data does not have a consistent underlying
distribution.
To determine the effect the hardware configuration has on performance, for each
program configuration (the Program and the Program Task factors), the performance
metrics associated with each hardware configuration will be compared pair-wise. They
will be compared with the Wilcoxon signed rank test, for the same reasons as above. A
pair-wise comparison of each hardware configuration is conducted, instead of a linear
model, to maintain consistency, since not all of the data conforms to an underlying
distribution and therefore a linear model cannot be done with that data.
Before the impact the RGM and the effect the hardware configuration has on
performance is determined, the underlying data will be examined in order to determine if
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the data has any internal relationships, that is departures from randomness, and to
determine how the data is distributed.
4.1 Internal Relationships of the Data
To determine whether a sample set has an internal relationship an autocorrelation plot
will be used. When the autocorrelation plot indicates the sample set may be internally
related, a lag plot will be used to view what the relationship is. Autocorrelation plots
graph the autocorrelation value of a sample shifted by multiple values, k. The
autocorrelation value measures the amount of correlation between a sample set and the
shifted sample set. It is a continuous value from 1 to -1, where 1 indicates strong positive
correlation, 0 indicates no correlation, and -1 indicates strong negative correlation. The
closer the autocorrelation value is to 0, the more random the sample is. Lag plots visually
represent the autocorrelation plot for k = 1. Lag Plots also show the existence of outliers.
The autocorrelation plots for each program is in Appendix A. For each program, the
autocorrelation plots show that the data for most of the configurations are random. For the
configurations of a program that are not random, lag plots are used to determine the
relationship of the data.
All of the configurations of 7-Zip is random, as shown in Figure A.1, except for
three: the base system with one core and 3GBs for compression and decompression and
the RGM with two cores and 2GBs for decompression. The lag plots in Figure 4.1 show a
linear relationship for the data points, centralized in the upper-right corner, and it shows
several outliers.
Figure A.2 shows that the underlying data for each configuration of Acrobat Reader
is random. However, the underlying data for three configurations of the Excel Spreadsheet
1 (the base system with one and two cores, and 2 GBs memory, and for the RGM with 2
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(a) Base System - Compression:
1 Core, 3 GB
(b) Base System - Decompres-
sion:
1 Core, 3 GB
(c) RGM - Decompression:
2 Cores, 2 GB
Figure 4.1: Lag Plots for 7-Zip
(a) Base System:
1 Core, 2 GB
(b) Base System:
2 Cores, 2 GB
(c) RGM:
2 Cores, 2 GB
Figure 4.2: Lag Plots for Excel, Spreadsheet 1
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(a) Base System:
1 Core, 2 GB
(b) RGM:
1 Core, 2 GB
(c) RGM:
2 Cores, 3 GB
Figure 4.3: Lag Plots for PowerPoint, Slide Show 2
cores and 3 GBs memory) is not random, as Figure A.3a shows. As shown in Figure 4.2,
the samples have a widely varying slightly linear relationship.
The underlying data for Internet Explorer, shown in Figure A.4, in all configurations,
is random. Figure A.5b shows that the underlying data for Slide 2 for PowerPoint is not
random for three of the configurations: the base system with one core and 2 GBs of
memory, the RGM with one core and 2 GBs of memory, and the RGM with 2 cores and 3
GBs of memory. Figure 4.3 shows that the samples have a widely varying slightly linear
relationship as is the case for the Excel Spreadsheet 1.
Finally, Figure A.6 shows that the data for the base system with one core and 2 GBs
of memory, and for the RGM with two cores and 3 GBs of memory, for both Word
documents, may be non-random. In addition, it shows that the base system, with one core
and 3 GBs of memory, for the Word document 2 may also have some non-randomness.
Figures 4.4a to 4.4d show that the samples have a linear relationship and are therefore not
random. Figure 4.4e shows that the samples for the base system, with one core and 3 GBs
of memory, for the Word document 2, is random, with the exception of some outliers.
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(a) Base System - Document 1:
1 Core, 2 GB
(b) RGM - Document 1:
2 Cores, 3 GB
(c) Base System - Document 2:
1 Core, 2 GB
(d) RGM - Document 2:
2 Cores, 3 GB
(e) Base System - Document 2:
1 Core, 3 GB
Figure 4.4: Lag Plots for Word
49
4.2 Determine Data Distribution
Distribution plots will be used to show how a sample set is distributed. Distribution
plots consist of a histogram of the data, a kernel density plot, and the kernel density plot
for a normal distribution superimposed on the same graph. The histogram groups the
values of the sample set into a number of bins and graphs the probability density of each
bin, which is based on the number of data points in each bin. The kernel density plot, in
this case, serves as a continuous version of the histogram. Both the histogram and the
kernel density plot show the shape of the sample set. The kernel density plot for a normal
distribution shows the shape of a normal distribution based on the sample set, the mean
and standard deviation of the normal distribution are set to the mean and standard
deviation of the sample set [26, p. 128-132].
The sample sets are compared to the normal distribution because it is a common
distribution and will provide a good basis for comparison. To determine if a sample set is
normally distributed, the kernel density plot of the sample set and the normal distribution
are compared; if the two kernel density plots are matched closely enough, the sample set
is considered normally distributed.
Appendix B contains the distribution plots for each configuration for each program.
While the samples for some of the configurations, such as the base system with one core
and 2 GBs of memory for Word document 1, shown in Figure B.6a, are approximately
normally distributed, not many of them are. Moreover, some of the program and task pairs
have no configuration that is normally distributed, such as Acrobat Reader PDF 1, as
Figure B.2a shows. Furthermore, there are many different types of distributions and some
of the sample sets do not conform to any standard distribution, such as Word document 2,
as shown in Figure B.6b.
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4.3 Effect of Factors on Performance
To determine which of the hardware configuration factors have a strong impact on the
performance of the system, each hardware configuration is compared pair-wise, for each
program configuration. To visualize the effect the hardware configuration factors have on
performance, for each program configuration pair, the box plots representing the sample
sets of each hardware configuration are graphed next to a graph of the difference between
each pair-wise hardware configuration. If the calculated difference between a pair of
hardware configurations is not statistically significant (its p-value is greater than 0.1), then
it is graphed as being zero on the the difference graph. The graphs for each program are in
Appendix C.
The graphs for 7-Zip, Figure C.1, show the effect the different hardware configuration
factors have on the performance of 7-Zip compression and decompression, on the base
system and with the RGM. The graphs show that the only time the performance metric,
compression or decompression speed, changes by any practically significant amount is
when the number of cores change. A practically significant performance change is one
that a user may be able to notice; a performance change that is not practically significant is
one that a user will not notice.
No practically significant performance metric changes occurred for Acrobat Reader
PDF 1, as shown in Figure C.2a. Figures C.2b to C.5 show a negligible difference (a
practically significant difference a user probably will not notice), for Acrobat Reader PDF
2 and the other programs, except Word, when the number of cores differ, but show no
practical difference for changes in memory size. Word shows a slightly higher impact to
performance from memory size differences than for the previous program configuration
pairs, as Figure C.6 shows.
Based on the aggregation of the above results, the number of cores has an impact on
performance, while the amount of memory does not, regardless of whether MOMS is
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running or not. Even though the number of cores has an effect on performance, the impact
is negligible, except for 7-Zip, since the maximum difference in execution time is about
400 milliseconds. The impact that the number of cores has on the compression and
decompression speed of 7-Zip is non-negligible, especially for large files, at about 2 MB/s
and 26 MB/s improvement, respectively. The probable reason that the memory size does
not have a practical impact on performance is that the test programs do not use enough
memory to be limited by the lower memory size limit, therefore they do not use the extra
memory, even though it is available. The memory size may have more of an impact when
other programs are used to test the system or if enough other tasks are going on.
Therefore, when deciding what the hardware configuration should be for a computer
running MOMS, MOMS should be tested with a workload that more accurately reflects
the environment of the average user; however, for the particular test programs used and
the, tasks they performed, the hardware configuration has a negligible impact on
performance, except for 7-Zip.
4.4 Effect of Magnesium Object Manager Sandbox on Peformance
Now that the effect of the hardware configuration factors have been determined, the
effect MOMS has on the performance, regardless of the workload or other factors, will be
determined. This analysis will be conducted in two parts, visually and through statistical
analysis. The visual analysis consists of box plots representing the performance data of
the system with and without MOMS, for each combination of factor level and workload;
this allows one to get a feeling of the relationship. The statistical analysis is a Wilcoxon
signed rank test to determine whether the perceived relationship is statistically significant,
and if it is whether there is a practical difference. Appendix D contains the box plots and
the statistical analysis for each hardware and program configuration pair.
For the hardware configuration of one core and 2 GBs of memory, the box plots,
shown in Figure D.1, indicate that the RGM mode decreases the performance of Internet
52
Explorer for both web pages and actually increases the performance of Word for the
second document and possibly for the first document. Since, the RGM adds additional
processing to the system and takes no steps to improve performance, such as performing
additional caching, performance cannot increase with the RGM running. Therefore, the
perceived performance increase is probably due to the system experiencing more overhead
when data was being gathered on the base system than on the system with the RGM
running. The additional overhead could come from sources such as the system responding
to increased network traffic or other processes conducting background work, even though
steps are taken to reduce this. The box plots indicate that for all the other program
configurations there is no difference in the performance of the base system and the system
with the RGM running.
The statistical analysis for the one core and 2 GBs of memory hardware
configuration, shown in Table D.1, shows that Internet Explorer does decrease
performance for both web pages and that Word does increase performance for both
documents. All the other program configurations either have no statistically significance
or no practical difference. The impact that the RGM has on Internet Explorer for the two
web pages, and on Word for the two documents, is negligible, with a maximum impact of
less than 400 milliseconds.
For one core and 3 GBs of memory, Figure D.2 indicates that the RGM decreases the
performance of Internet Explorer for both web pages, possibly decreases performance for
both slide shows for PowerPoint, and possibly increases the performance of Word on the
second document. The apparent increase in performance of Word for the second document
is probably due to the same reasons as above. Table D.2 shows that the RGM decreases
performance negligibly for both web pages on Internet Explorer, but does not impact
performance for the other programs, either statistically or practically significantly.
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The RGM decreases performance for the first web page on Internet Explorer, for
both slide shows on PowerPoint, and on Word for both documents, for the hardware
configuration of two cores and 2 GBs of memory, as Figure D.3 shows. It also indicates
that the performance of Internet Explorer, for the second web page, may increase with the
RGM running. Table D.3 shows that MOMS negligibly decreases the performance of
Internet Explorer for the first web page, but does not impact performance, statistically or
practically, for any of the other program configuration pairs.
Finally, for the two cores and 3 GBs of memory hardware configuration, Figure D.4
indicates that the RGM decreases performance for the first PDF on Acrobat Reader, for
the first web page on Internet Explorer, and for both documents on Excel, PowerPoint and
Word. Table D.4 shows that the first web page on Internet Explorer has a negligible
performance decrease due to the RGM, as does both documents for Word. It shows that
there is no statistically or practically significant performance impact for the other program
configuration pairs.
As shown in Appendix D and discussed above, and as summarized in Table 4.1 (the
statistically insignificant values have been set to zero), MOMS has a negligible impact to
performance.
4.5 Effectiveness of Magnesium Object Manager Sandbox
A set of exploits are run against the test programs to evaluate the effect the EnfM has
on the success of the associated payload. Since MOMS is not intended to protect
programs from compromises, but rather to protect the system from compromised
programs, an exploit is successful if its payload executes successfully. If the payload
successfully executes, it indicates that the sandboxed program gained access to more
objects than it is suppose to.
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7-Zip Compression -1 KB/s 0 KB/s 0 KB/s 0 KB/s
Decompression 0 KB/s 0 KB/s 0 KB/s 0 KB/s
Acrobat Reader PDF 1 -0.04 ms -0.65 ms -0.15 ms -15.51 ms
PDF 2 -10.82 ms 0 ms -15.51 ms -0.05 ms
Internet Explorer Web Page 1 -374.4 ms -358.94 ms -265.22 ms -280.79 ms
Web Page 2 -73.53 ms -73.61 ms 13.24 ms 0 ms
Excel Spreadsheet 1 15.62 ms -31.17 ms -15.47 ms -31.19 ms
Spreadsheet 2 0 ms -31.21 ms -15.57 ms -31.13 ms
PowerPoint Slide Show 1 0 ms -31.23 ms -31.19 ms -46.95 ms
Slide Show 2 16.29 ms -15.6 ms -31.25 ms -62.46 ms
Word Document 1 77.97 ms -15.6 ms -41.81 ms -124.71 ms
Document 2 125.03 ms 46.84 ms -31.16 ms -140.3 ms
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Exploits for each test program were searched for. Of the exploits found, only the
ones that are able to successfully execute their payload (many are able to compromise the
program but are unable to execute a payload, most likely due to other protections provided
by Windows 7 32-bit) are used to determine the effectiveness of the EnfM. Table 4.2
shows the EnfM stops all the payloads from executing, which indicates the EnfM is
effective at preventing exploit payloads from causing damage to the system; however, this
does not mean that the EnfM is effective at preventing all exploit payloads from causing
damage to the system.









Sun Java Runtime New
Plugin docbase Buffer Overflow [24] No
Internet Explorer CSS
Recursive Import Use After Free [37] No
MS11-050 IE
mshtml!CObjectElement Use After Free [15] No
Adobe Acrobat
Reader 9.0
Adobe CoolType SING Table
“uniqueName” Stack Buffer Overflow [23] No
Escape From PDF [46] No
Even though the EnfM is effective at preventing the exploits in Table 4.2, it does not
mean that it can prevent all exploit payloads. Some possible ways the EnfM could be
circumvented are through file system hard links, too generalized OALs, and non-specific
filenames.
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File system hard links are a feature of the NTFS file system that essentially gives a
file two or more names [20]. This can lead to a compromise of the rest of the system if a
file the sandboxed program should not have access to has a hard link to it made that has
the name of a file the sandboxed program should have access to; in other words, a file a
sandboxed program should not have access is given an additional file system level name of
a file the sandboxed program can access to, thereby giving the sandboxed program access
to the file it should not be able to access. To prevent this, the EnfM could be improved to
not allow access to any file that had a hard link made to it (can be accomplished through
the Windows API [18]), or if a file does have hard links to it, access can be allowed only if
all of the hard links are in the OAL (can be done through examining the NTFS file
attributes [32, 8], such as by using Windows utilities [17, 48]). Symbolic links are not a
problem because they require administrative access to create and the symbolic links are
resolved when the name lookup takes place, therefore the EnfM would not see the
symbolic name, just the actual name of the file.[14]
As is, the EnfM mode can allow access to objects just based on the beginning of the
name of the object. This is done so that the program can function without having to list
every object the program can access, even if the full name may not be known (such as
cached data in Internet Explorer) or is partially random. If the OAL is constructed in such
a way that one of these generalized entries gives the sandboxed program access to an
object it should not have access to, then the EnfM could be ineffective against the payload
of an exploit. This risk can be mitigated by allowing the OAL entries to be more specific,
such as through regular expression matching, allowing the administrator to specify the
form of the name, rather than just the beginning of the name that is constant.
Currently, MOMS looks for the main process by its short name, the name that shows
up in Windows Task Manager. Any executable on the system could be named the same as
one of the main processes. While this does not create a vulnerability, since a program that
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has the same name of a main process would just be put into the sandbox of the main
process, this could cause problems as MOMS is further developed. Therefore, MOMS
should look for main processes based on the full path of the executable, rather than just
the short name [52, 13].
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5 Conclusion and Future Work
MOMS is created as an alternative to the existing sandboxes that intercept system
calls in order to sandbox programs, and it is similar to sandboxes such as SELinux and
FreeBSD Jails. MOMS is implemented using the function callback functionality provided
by the Windows OM, which is the component that manages all objects and distributes
handles to those objects to user mode programs. Using this method, the RGM of MOMS
logs the objects that a sandboxed program accesses, the sandbox administrator then
modifies this list to create the OAL, and then the EnfM enforces the OAL
Once MOMS is implemented, a set of programs are used to test its efficiency and
effectiveness. Each test program had two different tasks to perform, such as opening an
appropriate document. Each program and task is run with and without the RGM, with 2 or
3 GBs of memory, and with one or two processor cores. The RGM is used to also indicate
the performance of the EnfM. The performance metrics are analyzed in two ways. To
determine whether the different hardware configurations, memory size and number of
processor cores, significantly impacted the performance of MOMS, the performance data
for each hardware configuration is compared, for each combination of program, program
task, and whether the RGM is running. From these comparisons, it is determined that the
number of processor cores generally affected performance much more than the amount of
memory, which is probably due to the test programs not using enough memory to benefit
from the increased memory; however, the performance is not affected enough to have a
significant practical effect, especially for the memory size. To determine the impact the
RGM has on performance, the performance metrics for each program, program task, and
hardware configuration combination, with and without the RGM running are compared.
This comparison showed that there is a statistically significant impact to performance
when programs are run with the RGM, but the difference is not practically significant.
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These results have limited application, since the programs, and the program tasks are
limited and not chosen at random; however, they do indicate that the performance impact
of the RGM is minimal, regardless of the hardware configuration. To make these results
more applicable, more programs and program tasks must be tested in a similar manner as
above. The programs and program tasks should also be chosen at random from programs
and tasks that represent the normal workload of a user. In addition, the performance of the
programs when the system is running several programs, such as what a normal user would
run, should be explored.
In addition to the performance impact of MOMS being tested, the effectiveness of
MOMS is determined by testing exploits to a subset of the above test programs and
recording whether the payload associated with each exploit executed successfully. MOMS
is successful in preventing the payloads of all the tested exploits from executing. Again,
these results have a limited applicability, but they do show that further testing, with a
wider range of exploits, is warranted. Furthermore, MOMS is analyzed to identify
possible vulnerabilities that could be exploited in order to limit its effectiveness. While
there are some vulnerabilities in the current implementation of MOMS, they are all
straight forward to fix.
5.1 Alternative Sandbox Methods
5.1.1 Automatic Program Confinement to Private Namespaces. Currently MOMS
only limits the effect a sandboxed program can have on the system, but it would be
beneficial to explore ways to limit the effect other programs can have on a sandboxed
program. One way to do this is to place objects a sandboxed process accesses into a
private namespace. Private namespaces are a feature of the OM that allow a program to
limit the processes that can access its objects [34]. While this feature is intended for
programs to place themselves into a private namespace, it may be possible to extend this
feature to allow arbitrary programs into their own private namespace, without rewriting
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the program. If it is possible it would be an effective way to limit the actions other
programs can take on the sandboxed program.
5.1.2 Automatically Assign Processes to Jobs. An alternative method to restrict
the objects a process can access is to create Job objects that have only the rights for a
program to run, and then assign processes of the program to the Job. This method would
provide similar protections as the MOMS does, but it would rely entirely on official
functionality (currently the SupportsObjectCallbacks field must be altered for each object
type) and it may be more efficient. This method could also be extended to limit the ways
processes can interact with sandboxed programs by assigning them to a Job that does not
allow them access to the objects that the sandboxed programs access.
In its current state, MOMS is a good start to exploring other sandboxing methods on
Windows; however, more work is needed to expand this research and to determine the best
way to sandbox programs on Windows.
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Appendix A: Autocorrelation Plots
(a) Compression
(b) Decompression








Figure A.3: Autocorrelation Plots for Excel
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(a) Web Page 1
(b) Web Page 2
Figure A.4: Autocorrelation Plots for Internet Explorer
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(a) Slide Show 1
(b) Slide Show 2




Figure A.6: Autocorrelation Plots for Word
67
Appendix B: Distribution Plots
(a) Compression
(b) Decompression








Figure B.3: Distribution Plot For Excel
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(a) Web Page 1
(b) Web Page 2
Figure B.4: Distribution Plot For Internet Explorer
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(a) Slide Show 1
(b) Slide Show 2




Figure B.6: Distribution Plot For Word
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Appendix C: Effect of Hardware Configuration on Performance
(a) Compression
(b) Decompression








Figure C.3: Hardware Configuration Performance Results for Excel
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(a) Web Page 1
(b) Web Page 2
Figure C.4: Hardware Configuration Performance Results for Internet Explorer
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(a) Slide Show 1
(b) Slide Show 2




Figure C.6: Hardware Configuration Performance Results for Word
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Appendix D: Performance Impact of Magnesium Object Manager Sandbox
Figure D.1: Performance Impact of MOMS: 1 Core, 2 GB
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Table D.1: Performance Impact Results of MOMS: 1 Core, 2 GB
Program Document
Difference
(Baseline - RGM) Units p-value
7-Zip Compression -1.000009 KB/s 1.259322e-06
Decompression 1.598204e-05 KB/s 0.2136175
Acrobat Reader PDF 1 -0.04093948 ms 0.05880068
PDF 2 -10.81654 ms 4.651519e-05
Internet Explorer Web Page 1 -374.3966 ms 4.084449e-57
Web Page 2 -73.52848 ms 2.233854e-83
Excel Spreadsheet 1 15.62357 ms 0.04867886
Spreadsheet 2 0.004699188 ms 0.8958299
PowerPoint Slide Show 1 -15.53777 ms 0.1704044
Slide Show 2 16.28919 ms 0.002637716
Word Document 1 77.96559 ms 4.604308e-20
Document 2 125.0297 ms 8.180757e-55
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Figure D.2: Performance Impact of MOMS: 1 Core, 3 GB
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Table D.2: Performance Impact Results of MOMS: 1 Core, 3 GB
Program Document
Difference
(Baseline - RGM) Units p-value
7-Zip Compression 4.297132e-05 KB/s 0.007803446
Decompression 4.981807e-05 KB/s 0.002834431
Acrobat Reader PDF 1 -0.6517044 ms 1.389387e-07
PDF 2 -0.03653842 ms 0.4229165
Internet Explorer Web Page 1 -358.9382 ms 7.045827e-53
Web Page 2 -73.61211 ms 7.865689e-83
Excel Spreadsheet 1 -31.1707 ms 9.01863e-07
Spreadsheet 2 -31.20813 ms 2.177921e-05
PowerPoint Slide Show 1 -31.22941 ms 1.135776e-13
Slide Show 2 -15.60341 ms 4.65167e-12
Word Document 1 -15.59549 ms 0.0009502865
Document 2 46.84255 ms 7.914954e-16
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Figure D.3: Performance Impact of MOMS: 2 Cores, 2 GB
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Table D.3: Performance Impact Results of MOMS: 2 Core, 2 GB
Program Document
Difference
(Baseline - RGM) Units p-value
7-Zip Compression 5.13232e-06 KB/s 0.00500766
Decompression 2.628481e-05 KB/s 0.6973014
Acrobat Reader PDF 1 -0.1462755 ms 3.266672e-13
PDF 2 -15.5056 ms 5.370356e-06
Internet Explorer Web Page 1 -265.2194 ms 1.136964e-51
Web Page 2 13.23786 ms 1.292535e-09
Excel Spreadsheet 1 -15.465 ms 9.727734e-05
Spreadsheet 2 -15.57145 ms 3.298751e-08
PowerPoint Slide Show 1 -31.19289 ms 1.96343e-18
Slide Show 2 -31.25074 ms 3.227453e-28
Word Document 1 -41.81169 ms 1.305241e-66
Document 2 -31.16406 ms 5.532732e-54
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Figure D.4: Performance Impact of MOMS: 2 Cores, 3 GB
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Table D.4: Performance Impact Results of MOMS: 2 Core, 3 GB
Program Document
Difference
(Baseline - RGM) Units p-value
7-Zip Compression 3.125371e-05 KB/s 0.8182311
Decompression 1.791934e-05 KB/s 0.0006328919
Acrobat Reader PDF 1 -15.50572 ms 7.213207e-25
PDF 2 -0.05368079 ms 0.0266545
Internet Explorer Web Page 1 -280.7928 ms 1.180738e-47
Web Page 2 0.8109125 ms 0.4801655
Excel Spreadsheet 1 -31.18607 ms 1.793086e-25
Spreadsheet 2 -31.12865 ms 1.538028e-22
PowerPoint Slide Show 1 -46.94565 ms 3.390136e-42
Slide Show 2 -62.45836 ms 1.033036e-53
Word Document 1 -124.7062 ms 1.477834e-70
Document 2 -140.3046 ms 7.622166e-68
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